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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy judges are not appointed under Article III of the 
Constitution, as district and courts of appeals judges are, and they 
do not have the protection of life tenure granted to those judges. 
In 1984, Congress adopted a bankruptcy jurisdiction act that 
divided matters in a bankruptcy case into “core” and “non-core” 
proceedings. Core proceedings are generally those inherently part of 
the bankruptcy process, and if a matter is core, the bankruptcy judge 
may handle the matter and enter final judgment, subject to appellate 
review by the district court. If a matter is non-core, and the parties 
have not consented to final adjudication by the bankruptcy court, the 
bankruptcy judge may only propose findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. The district court must review those findings de novo and 
enter final judgment.
In a 2011 decision, Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, the Court held 
that a bankruptcy judge cannot enter a final judgment even in a 
“core” matter if the underlying cause of action does not “stem from 
the bankruptcy itself.” That is, even if Congress designated a matter 
as “core,” if it is simply a suit between the debtor and another party 
that does not arise from the bankruptcy and would normally be 
heard by an Article III judge, it cannot be decided by the bankruptcy 
judge. Stern did not decide how such claims should be dealt with, 
however, given that they cannot constitutionally be handled as the 
statute provides. In 2014, the Court decided Executive Benefits Ins. 
Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, holding that a Stern claim can be 
handled as if it were a non-core claim, with the bankruptcy judge 
entering proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
Lower courts have had an extremely difficult time determining 
whether various claims “stem from the bankruptcy itself,” 
giving rise to a great deal of gamesmanship and litigation over 
jurisdictional issues. Stern and Arkison also declined to address 
whether Stern claims can be decided by bankruptcy judges if the 
litigants consent and, if so, whether that consent must be explicit 
or if failure to object waives the argument that the court lacks 
jurisdiction. Wellness International Network v. Sharif presents  
these issues.   
ISSUES
Does the presence of a state property law issue in a creditor’s action 
to determine whether property belongs to the bankruptcy estate 
mean that such action does not “stem from the bankruptcy itself,” 
depriving the bankruptcy court of constitutional authority to enter a 
final judgment on the issue? 
Does Article III permit the bankruptcy courts to adjudicate claims 
against a debtor where the debtor has “consented” by voluntarily 
filing for bankruptcy relief or by not timely raising an objection to 
the court’s jurisdiction? 
FACTS
Wellness International Network, Ltd., obtained a judgment for more 
than $655,000 against Richard Sharif for his failure to comply 
with discovery requests in a suit Sharif had filed against Wellness. 
Sharif then filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, seeking to discharge 
the judgment. Wellness filed an adversary proceeding with five 
counts. The first four argued that Sharif’s debt to Wellness was 
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nondischargeable, and the fifth sought a declaratory judgment that 
a trust of which Sharif was trustee was actually Sharif’s alter ego. 
The fifth count further sought judgment that the trust’s assets were 
therefore part of the bankruptcy estate. Sharif continued his dilatory 
tactics, and the bankruptcy judge entered a default judgment in 
Wellness’s favor. Sharif appealed to the district court. 
The Supreme Court then decided Stern, setting limits on bankruptcy 
court jurisdiction, but Sharif did not raise any objection to the 
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction in his initial appellate brief. 
However, both Sharif and his sister (the beneficiary of the trust) 
later raised the argument. The district court held that Sharif waived 
the issue when he failed to raise it, affirming the bankruptcy 
court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the 
constitutional argument could not be waived because “it implicates 
separation of powers principles,” not just personal rights of the 
litigants. While upholding the judgment on the nondischargeability 
claims, the court of appeals held that, under Stern, the bankruptcy 
court lacked constitutional authority to determine the alter ego 
claim. 
CASE ANALYSIS
Prior to 1978, federal district courts could refer matters within 
the traditional “summary jurisdiction” of bankruptcy courts to 
specialized bankruptcy referees. This included claims involving 
property in the actual or constructive possession of the bankruptcy 
court. Proceedings to augment the bankruptcy estate, however, 
implicated the district court’s plenary jurisdiction and were not 
referred to the bankruptcy courts absent both parties’ consent. 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 granted expanded powers 
to bankruptcy judges, giving them jurisdiction over “all civil 
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to 
cases under title 11.” Bankruptcy judges were granted all of 
the “powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty,” with only 
a few limited exceptions, although they were not afforded the 
protections of Article III judges—life tenure and a salary that may 
not be diminished. In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the Court held that the 1978 
act was unconstitutional to the extent it granted bankruptcy 
judges jurisdiction to decide a state-law contract claim against 
an entity not otherwise a party to the bankruptcy. The Court 
distinguished between cases involving so-called “public rights,” 
which may be removed from the jurisdiction of Article III courts, 
and cases involving “private rights,” which may not, noting that 
“the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core 
of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the 
adjudication of state-created private rights.” 
Congress responded by enacting the Bankruptcy Amendments and 
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, under which federal district courts 
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all bankruptcy cases, 
and may refer to bankruptcy judges any “proceedings arising under 
title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.” This largely 
recreated the bifurcated jurisdictional scheme that existed prior to 
1978, dividing all matters that may be referred to the bankruptcy 
court into two categories: “core” and “non-core” proceedings. 
“Core proceedings” are not defined, but the statute provides a non-
exhaustive list of them. The statute authorizes bankruptcy judges to 
“hear and determine” core claims and “enter appropriate orders and 
judgments” on them. A final judgment entered in a core proceeding 
is appealable to the district court.
For “non-core” proceedings—those that are not core but are 
“otherwise related to a case under title 11”—the bankruptcy court 
may hear the matter and “submit proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to the district court.” The district court must 
review those proposed findings and conclusions de novo and enter 
any final orders or judgments. However, if all parties “consent,” 
the statute permits the bankruptcy judge to determine a non-core 
proceeding as if it were core. 
In Stern, the debtor had filed a common-law counterclaim for 
tortious interference against a creditor. “Counterclaims by the 
estate against persons filing claims against the estate” are listed 
in the statute as core proceedings, but the Court held that Article 
III would not permit the bankruptcy court to determine this 
counterclaim. It was a state-law claim that did not stem from the 
bankruptcy case, and Congress could not vest the power to hear such 
a claim in a non-Article III court. The decision did not explain how 
these “Stern claims” should be handled, however, creating a great 
deal of confusion in the lower courts. In Arkison, the Court clarified 
that such cases could be treated as non-core proceedings, although 
it did not address whether the bankruptcy court could hear such a 
case if the parties had expressly or impliedly consented. 
Sharif (respondent) argues that the bankruptcy court could not 
constitutionally determine whether the trust was his alter ego as 
that is a matter of state law that does not stem from the bankruptcy 
case. That is, he claims it is a “Stern claim,” an attempt to augment 
the bankruptcy estate through a suit asserting a claim under non-
bankruptcy law. 
Petitioners argue that the bankruptcy court was determining 
whether assets that were within Sharif’s (actual or constructive) 
possession are assets of the bankruptcy estate, and that whether 
assets belong to the bankruptcy estate is a matter that necessarily 
arises directly out of the bankruptcy case. That the underlying 
rules are matters of state law does not matter, according to 
petitioners—as there is no federal common law, property and 
contract law questions are necessarily determined by state law, but 
whether assets belong to the estate is a question that could not exist 
independent of the bankruptcy case itself. Indeed, the determination 
of nearly every claim filed by a creditor—perhaps the central 
indisputable power of a bankruptcy court—requires the application 
of state law. Moreover, petitioners argue, a bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction is primarily in rem, and a court necessarily has power to 
determine its own jurisdiction. A bankruptcy court has to be able to 
determine what assets are, and are not, part of the estate. To decide 
otherwise would render efficient administration of bankruptcy cases 
almost impossible. 
Sharif responds that a bankruptcy court can determine whether 
assets that are in the debtor’s possession are property of the estate, 
but an action against a third party to bring that party’s assets into 
the estate is another matter. If a third party has a colorable claim 
to the asset, Sharif argues, it has never fallen within the summary 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. Here, Sharif argues, the assets 
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belong to a trust, which is a separate legal entity, and the beneficial 
interest is in his sister. As the trustee, Sharif’s only interest is “bare 
legal title,” which permits him to exercise administrative powers 
on behalf of the trust. Thus, Sharif argues, Wellness’s claim is an 
attempt to use a state-law alter ego theory to bring the assets of a 
third party into the estate. The alter ego action does not arise from 
the bankruptcy case, he argues, making this similar to Stern—an 
attempt to use a state-law cause of action, independent of the 
bankruptcy code, to find assets to augment the estate.
The outcome of this issue will depend on both the definition of Stern 
claims (what core claims are outside the constitutional authority of 
non-Article III judges?) and the characterization of Wellness’s cause 
of action (is it an attempt to determine whether property belonged 
to Sharif, or an attempt to bring the assets of a third party into 
the estate?). It is the former question that requires clarification if 
continued litigation over jurisdictional questions is to be curtailed, 
and a narrow ruling based on the latter question would do little to 
resolve matters for lower courts and future litigants. 
The second issue is whether a party may consent to bankruptcy 
court adjudication of a Stern claim and, if so, what acts would 
amount to “consent.” This is important because litigants may want 
to permit the bankruptcy court to hear a dispute, as a matter of 
efficiency, but if they cannot consent to this, matters will have to be 
referred to district courts for final adjudication. This would increase 
the workload of the district courts, and might also have implications 
for the management of other litigation matters where magistrates 
or special masters are used to handle various aspects of litigation. 
Magistrates often enter final judgments, with consent of the parties, 
on matters that would otherwise be the exclusive province of Article 
III courts. 
Sharif argues that the limits of Article III cannot be avoided by the 
parties’ consent because they are structural protections that are part 
of the constitutional separation of powers. Wellness responds that 
Article III has typically been viewed primarily as protecting personal 
rather than structural interests, and unless Congress is seeking to 
deprive the Article III courts of their rightful authority, individuals 
may waive objections under Article III. Moreover, as the bankruptcy 
courts are divisions of the district court, and the district court 
may withdraw the reference when it wants to exercise jurisdiction 
directly, there is no structural Article III issue in the ability to refer 
matters to the bankruptcy court, Shariff concludes.
Petitioners then argue that Sharif waived any objection to 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction in two separate ways: first, by filing 
the bankruptcy petition, Sharif consented to the bankruptcy court’s 
authority to decide the issue; second, he waived any objection to the 
bankruptcy court’s authority by not raising it in a timely manner. 
Sharif responds that a waiver must be a knowing and deliberate act, 
and that he never acted in a way that would waive his objection. 
He did admit in his answer that Wellness’s complaint was a core 
proceeding but argues that this applied to the first four counts 
(nondischargeability), and there was no intent to consent to 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the alter ego claim. At the time 
Sharif answered the complaint, Stern had not yet been decided, and 
he could not reasonably be understood to have waived an objection 
based on a ruling the Court had not yet issued. Moreover, notes 
Sharif, his sister, who arguably holds the beneficial interest in the 
disputed assets, never consented to the bankruptcy court’s authority. 
In support, Sharif notes that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure require that “in non-core proceedings final orders and 
judgments shall not be entered on the bankruptcy judge’s order 
except with the express consent of the parties.” If “express consent” 
is required in non-core matters, Sharif argues, waiver or implied 
consent cannot be deemed adequate consent in a core matter. 
However, Wellness points out that the bankruptcy jurisdictional 
statute only requires “consent” for a bankruptcy judge to enter 
final judgment in a non-core matter, but “express consent” for a 
bankruptcy court to conduct a jury trial, indicating that implied 
consent is enough in the former case. And the rules of procedure 
cannot change the provisions of the statute.
SIGNIFICANCE 
The scope of authority that Congress can grant to bankruptcy 
judges consistent with Article III has important implications for 
the functioning of the bankruptcy system, and potentially for the 
overall operation of the federal courts. If the Court gives a broad 
interpretation to Stern claims, many issues now heard by bankruptcy 
judges would have to be decided by district court judges, increasing 
their workload. A broad interpretation might also affect the ability 
of federal courts to delegate responsibilities to magistrates, who 
play an important role in many types of litigation. Dicta in Stern 
indicates that the Court did not intend a broad reading, however, so 
this is perhaps unlikely.
The question of consent to bankruptcy court authority over Stern 
claims is perhaps of greater concern. Consent is a keystone to the 
system of magistrates commonly used, with the authority of the 
magistrate depending on “consent,” which can include implied 
consent. The American Bar Association has adopted a position that 
litigant consent should be adequate to cure any Article III problems 
with bankruptcy court determination of Stern claims, and argues 
that a contrary position would have a significant impact on the 
workload of the district courts, with a potentially staggering effect if 
the ruling were to extend to the work of magistrate judges. 
Marshall Tracht is a professor of law at New York Law School. He 
can be reached at mtracht@nyls.edu or 212.431.2139.
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In December, the Court heard a number of interesting cases. Below we highlight some of the more engaging exchanges  
between the justices and the advocates during Elonis v. United States (13-983). Elonis involved threats posted on Facebook  
and the First Amendment; specifically, the Court was asked to determine whether a conviction for threatening  
another person requires proof of the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten. 
Justice Elena Kagan: [G]etting back to what the Chief Justice 
asked you, because I was a little bit surprised by your answer: I’m 
trying to figure out what exactly the level of intent you want is. So 
one, the very, very highest level might be I affirmatively want to 
place this person in fear; that’s why I’m doing what I’m doing. All 
right? There’s a step down from that which is: I don’t want to do 
that; I’m just fulfilling my artistic fantasies, whatever you want to 
call it; but I know that I am going to place this person in fear. All 
right? Is that what—which intent do you want?
Mr. John P. Elwood (on behalf of petitioner): The second.
Justice Kagan: The second.
Mr. Elwood: That if you know that you are placing someone in fear 
by what you are doing, that is enough to satisfy our version[.]
 *  *  *  *
Justice Kagan: Well, what would be wrong with a recklessness 
standard? Why is that too low? It seems that a recklessness 
standard has a kind of buffer zone around it. You know, it gets you 
up one level from what the government wants, so what—who 
is the person that we should be worried is going to be convicted 
under a recklessness standard?
Mr. Elwood: I think many of the speakers who are online and many 
of the people who are being prosecuted now are teenagers who 
are essentially shooting off their mouths or making sort of ill-timed, 
sarcastic comments which wind up getting them thrown in jail.
 *  *  *  *
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: And could you continue, you were 
telling me how that would be proved what is in his head. He knew 
that she or a reasonable person would be put in fear. So how does 
the government prove that?
Mr. Elwood: The government would prove it by, you know, proving 
the circumstances, what he said, you know, how he saw people 
reacting to it, his own personal statements about things at the time.
 *  *  *  *
Mr. Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of respondent): What we want 
is a standard that holds accountable people for the ordinary and 
natural meaning of the words that they say in context …
Chief Justice John Roberts: Well, but in context is right. What is 
it? Is it a reasonable person and the examples that were given of 
the, you know, teenagers on the Internet, or is it a—reasonable 
teenager on the Internet.
(Laughter.)
Mr. Dreeben: If there is such a thing. Sorry, Mr. Chief Justice.
 *  *  *  *
Chief Justice Roberts: Well, I know, but you are asking for a 
standard that presumably would apply across the board. So if the 
teenager has a lot of friends on his Facebook page, then you are 
going to evaluate it by a different standard; you know, friends all 
over different age groups and everything else, that’s a different 
standard than if he has only a few friends that have access to his 
statements?
Mr. Dreeben: It will depend on to whom he is communicating the 
statement. We all know that if we’re communicating among friends, 
particularly in face-to-face context, we can say certain things that 
will be understood as sarcasm. But when we widen the audience 
and put a statement out in a situation where reasonable people are 
going to react to it by saying, this requires attention, this is a threat 
against an elementary school.
 *  *  *  *
Justice Sonia Sotomayor: We’ve been loathe to create more 
exceptions to the First Amendment.
Mr. Dreeben: I don’t think that these are …
Justice Sotomayor: I don’t know where in the common law you 
have found a hook to say that we should create this as another 
exception.
Mr. Dreeben: Well, I don’t think it’s an exception. I think it’s just part 
of the implementation. 
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This will be the latest case since Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004), to examine what is “testimonial” hearsay 
for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. At least four other 
cases, including Crawford, clearly involved some sort of 
in-person police questioning. Here, two school teachers with 
a mandatory statutory duty to report suspected child abuse 
questioned a young child in their care about his injuries. 
Whether the questioners’ identity and/or their statutory duty 
makes any difference regarding “testimonial” hearsay for 
Confrontation Clause purposes are among the central issues 
here. 
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individuals who purchase health insurance through any 
state or federal exchange. The plaintiffs challenged the IRS 
rule, arguing that the ACA does not authorize tax credits for 
purchasers through a federal exchange. 
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